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Optimism is associated with a range of beneﬁts not only for general well-being, but also for mental and
physical health. The development of psychological interventions to boost optimism derived from
cognitive science would have the potential to provide signiﬁcant public health beneﬁts, yet cognitive
markers of optimism are little understood. The current study aimed to take a ﬁrst step in this direction
by identifying a cognitive marker for optimism that could provide a modiﬁable target for innovative
interventions. In particular we predicted that the ability to generate vivid positive mental imagery of
the future would be associated with dispositional optimism. A community sample of 237 participants
completed a survey comprising measures of mental imagery and optimism, and socio-demographic
information. Vividness of positive future imagery was signiﬁcantly associated with optimism, even
when adjusting for socio-demographic factors and everyday imagery use. The ability to generate vivid
mental imagery of positive future events may provide a modiﬁable cognitive marker of optimism.
Boosting positive future imagery could provide a cognitive target for treatment innovations to promote
optimism, with implications for mental health and even physical well-being.
& 2012 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. Open access under CC BY license. 1. Introduction
Why is it that some people see the future as bright and full of
potential, whereas for others it holds only uncertainty or appre-
hension? Dispositional optimism refers to the tendency to have
generalized positive expectancies about the future (Carver et al.,
2010). Most people show an ‘‘optimism bias’’, expecting positive
events rather than negative events to happen in the future, even
without supporting evidence (Weinstein, 1980).
It has been argued that optimism is adaptive and an important
product of human evolution (Sharot, 2011). An increasing body of
evidence suggests that optimism has an impact not only on general
well-being, but also on mental and physical health (Carver et al.,
2010). Longitudinal studies have demonstrated that higher levels of
optimism are associated with lower cumulative incidence of depres-
sion symptoms over a 15-year period (Giltay et al., 2006b), with
reduced risk of future cardiovascular disease in a range of popula-
tions (Giltay et al., 2006a; Tindle et al., 2009; Boehm et al., 2011),ax: þ44 1223 359 062.
.uk (S.E. Blackwell).
der CC BY license. and even with reduced rate of death (Giltay et al., 2004). Optimism
is thus linked to positive outcomes in areas that represent huge
public burdens such as depression and cardiovascular disease
(World Health Organization, 2008). In the context of the need to
develop inexpensive and accessible treatment options (Simon and
Ludman, 2009), optimism presents a target for a low-intensity
psychological interventions in these high-priority areas.
Although some potential psychological interventions to
increase optimism have been described (e.g. Riskind et al.,
1996; Meevissen et al., 2011), the development of novel inter-
ventions for optimism is most likely to be successful if it is rooted
in an understanding of the basic underlying processes, and this is
currently lacking. Developing an understanding of the cognitive
and emotional processes underlying optimism using an ‘‘experi-
mental medicine’’ approach (Rutter and Plomin, 2009) could drive
more targeted treatment innovation. This corresponds to the
‘‘basic science discovery’’ phase in the development of new
interventions (Thornicroft et al., 2011).
A potential neural substrate for optimism has been suggested.
Sharot et al. (2007) found increased activation in the right
anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) when participants imagined
positive future events, compared to when they imagined negative
1 There were no signiﬁcant differences in socio-demographic characteristics of
those who did or did not respond to the invitation to take part in the study, with
the exception of nationality and age. Thus, the sample for the current sample was
broadly representative of the ROM reference sample as a whole, except that
responders were signiﬁcantly more likely to be Dutch, w2(1,457)¼6.52, P¼0.01,
and were signiﬁcantly older, t(545)¼4.90, Po0.001, than non-responders. All
other Ps were 40.10, with the exception of gender, where there was a trend for a
greater proportion of responders to be male than non-responders, w2(1,457)¼3.54,
P¼0.06. The ROM reference study had also included the LOT-R, and there were no
differences between responders and non-responders on this prior administration,
t(544)o1.
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was greater for participants with higher levels of self-reported
optimism. While the identiﬁcation of brain regions per se does
not easily lend itself to novel treatment development, this study
suggests a potentially modiﬁable cognitive marker: the paradigm
used involved the generation of mental imagery, that is, imagining
autobiographical episodes.
We propose that a candidate cognitive marker for optimism is
the ability to generate vivid mental images of positive events
occurring in the future. Imagining the future may play a key role
in our day-to-day functioning and has been the subject of much
recent research interest (e.g. Schacter et al., 2008; Addis et al.,
2009; Crisp et al., 2011; D’Argembeau et al., 2011). Compared to
verbal thought, mental imagery has a powerful effect on emotion
(Holmes and Mathews, 2005; Holmes et al., 2008), and thus
mental images may be a particularly powerful form of future
thinking. What evidence might support our hypothesis? Sharot
et al. (2007) found that participants reporting higher levels of
optimism were more likely to expect the positive events they
imagined to happen closer in the future than negative events, and
were more likely to imagine them with a greater sense of ‘‘pre-
experiencing’’. On the other hand, people with depressed mood
showed reduced ability to generate vivid mental images of
positive future events (Holmes et al., 2008). Further, Morina
et al. (2011) found that patients with major depressive disorder
and those with anxiety disorders showed reduced ability to
generate vivid mental images of positive future events compared
to healthy controls, and also rated the events as less likely to
occur in the near future.
Support for a link between imagery of the future and optimism
also comes from experimental studies that have investigated the
potential of imagery tasks to boost optimism. Meevissen et al.
(2011) investigated the impact on optimism of practising a ‘‘Best
Possible Self’’ (BPS) imagery exercise every day for 2 weeks.
This built on work by Fosnaugh et al. (2010) demonstrating
that optimism was manipulable in an experimental setting, and
a subsequent study by Peters et al. (2010) that showed an
immediate impact on optimism of engaging in a BPS imagery
exercise. The BPS imagery exercise involved imagining a future
self in which everything had turned out in the most optimal way.
In the study by Meevissen et al. (2011), participants were asked to
repeat the imagery exercise for 5 min each day at home over a
2-week period. In a control condition participants instead carried
out the imagery exercise about their daily activities in the past
24 h. Participants in the BPS imagery condition (n¼28) showed
signiﬁcant increases in self-reported optimism over the 2 weeks,
whereas participants in the control condition (n¼26) did not
show this increase. This therefore provides some evidence that
engaging in positive future imagery may lead to increases in
optimism in the short term, whereas engaging in past imagery
does not.
There is therefore convergent evidence from both ends of the
optimism spectrum to suggest that positive future imagery may
be important, and from experimental studies that deliberate
engagement in positive future imagery can increase optimism.
However, a fundamental part of the puzzle is missing. That is, is
optimism in fact associated with greater ability to generate vivid
mental images of positive events in the future? At ﬁrst glance it
may sound self-evident that people who can more easily imagine
a positive future would be more optimistic, but strikingly this has
not been put to the test, and in fact the widely used measure of
optimism, the Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R; Scheier et al.,
1994), makes no mention of positive imagination per se. Even in
the study by Meevissen et al. (2011) described above, as both the
experimental conditions involved engaging in imagery, the study
cannot demonstrate whether the imagery component of theexercise was crucial for the effects of the task (as opposed to
simply thinking about positive futures), or whether the increase
in optimism observed in the experimental group was the result of
speciﬁc cognitive changes such as increased accessibility of
positive future imagery. The key hypothesised link between
optimism and vividness of positive future imagery therefore
remains untested.
The current study aimed to test the hypothesis that within a
community sample, higher levels of optimism would be asso-
ciated with the ability to generate more vivid mental imagery of
positive future events, as measured by vividness ratings on the
Prospective Imagery Test (PIT). We predicted that this relation-
ship would remain signiﬁcant when adjusting for other poten-
tially confounding variables. The study further aimed to extend
the ﬁndings of Sharot et al. (2007) by investigating the relation-
ship between the sense of likelihood and pre-experiencing of
future imagery and optimism, by adding ratings of likelihood and
experiencing to the PIT.2. Method
2.1. Participants
The study sample was drawn from the Routine Outcome Monitoring (ROM; de
Beurs et al., 2011) reference study (Schulte-van Maaren et al., 2012). The ROM
reference study comprised a population-based sample of Dutch participants aged
18–65, randomly selected from registration systems of eight general practitioners
(GPs) in the province of South-Holland, the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, 99.9%
of the general population is registered with a GP, and thus non-consulting GP
patients provide a good representation of the general population. The ROM
reference group was stratiﬁed according to the composition of the ROM patient
group (regarding age, gender, and urbanization). As a reference sample, partici-
pants with cognitive difﬁculties such as dementia or who had received treatment
for a psychiatric disorder within the past 6 months were excluded. The 547 people
in the reference study who had agreed to be contacted for research were invited
by letter to participate, with the questionnaires and return envelope enclosed, and
258 elected to take part.1 Twenty-one participants returned incomplete ques-
tionnaires and were excluded, leaving a ﬁnal sample of 237 (152 men and 85
women).
2.2. Measures
Socio-demographic variables (e.g. age, gender, education) were collected as
part of the ROM reference study. For the current study, participants further
completed the following questionnaires.
2.2.1. Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R; Scheier et al., 1994).
This 10-item questionnaire was used to assess dispositional optimism. Items
were rated on a 5-point scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). Three
items were positively worded (e.g. ‘‘I’m always optimistic about my future’’), and
three were negatively worded and reverse-scored (e.g. ‘‘I hardly ever expect things
to go my way’’). Four items were ﬁller, and participants’ responses to these were
not used in calculating their score. Higher total scores (ranging from 0 through 24)
were indicative of higher levels of optimism. Although some have argued that the
positively worded and negatively worded items on the LOT-R should be scored
separately to generate separate optimism and pessimism scales (e.g. Kubzansky
et al., 2004), we used the original scoring as described by the authors of the scale,
consistent with other studies investigating optimism in the context of mental
imagery (e.g. Sharot et al., 2007; Meevissen et al., 2011). The LOT-R has been used
in numerous studies investigating optimism (Carver et al., 2010), and Scheier et al.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and hierarchical multiple regression analyses predicting scores on the Life Orientation Test-Revised via socio-demographic data and measures of
imagery.
Predictor M (S.D.) r0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b b b
Age (years) 43.11 (12.61) 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.15n
Gender n (%)
Female 85 (36%) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.06
Married/cohabiting 164 (69%) 0.22nnn 0.07 0.07 0.08
Living alone 42 (18%) 0.27nnn 0.19n 0.19n 0.13
University level education 196 (83%) 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.05
Dutch nationality 231 (98%) 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.03
Current smoker 44 (19%) 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.003
No or hardly any alcohol use 23 (10%) 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.034
Health status
Self-rated ‘‘healthy’’ 221 (93%) 0.20nn 0.16n 0.15n 0.03
Serious illness diagnosed 47 (20%) 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04
SUIS 35.15 (8.56) 0.03 0.01 0.09
PIT-Negative
Vividness 2.81 (0.97) 0.08 0.06 0.23nnn
PIT-Positive
Vividness 3.88 (0.68) 0.44nnn 0.52nnn
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.08 0.28
DR2 0.003 0.19
F for DR2 0.41 63.81nnn
Model F 3.26nn 2.77nn 8.18nnn
N¼237.
Model 1 includes socio-demographic variables only. Model 2 additionally includes control imagery variables. Model 3 additionally includes positive future imagery
vividness. r0¼zero order correlations. SUIS¼Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale. PIT-Negative/Positive¼Prospective Imagery Test Negative/Positive items.
n Po0.05.
nn Po0.01.
nnn Po0.001.
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gent and discriminant validity. Internal consistency in our sample was
acceptable (a¼0.77).
2.2.2. Prospective Imagery Test (PIT; Sto¨ber, 2000; Holmes et al., 2008).
The PIT is a measure of deliberately generated positive and negative mental
images of potential future events. Participants were presented with 10 positive and
10 negative future scenarios and generated a mental image of each. Participants rated
the vividness of each image on a scale from 1 (no image at all) to 5 (very vivid).
To obtain further information about the quality of imagery generated (cf. Sharot et al.,
2007), participants rated their perceived ‘‘likelihood’’ of each event occurring in the
near future from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely), and to what extent they felt that they
were ‘‘experiencing’’ each event while imagining it from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely).
In the current study we were primarily interested in responses to the positive items,
and included the negative items to control for general ability to generate future
imagery. As internal consistency had not previously been reported for subscales of
the PIT, we calculated Cronbach’s a for our sample. All subscales demonstrated good
internal consistency (0.83oao0.90).
2.2.3. Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS; Reisberg et al., 2003).
This 12-item questionnaire was included to control for everyday imagery use.
Participants rated items such as ‘‘When I think about visiting a relative, I almost
always have a clear mental picture of him or her’’ on a scale from 1 (never
appropriate) to 5 (always appropriate). Reisberg et al. (2003) report excellent
internal consistency (a¼0.98) and good convergent validity. Internal consistency
in our sample was good (a¼0.81).(footnote continued)
week; self-rated health as ‘‘healthy’’ vs. self-rated health as ‘‘unhealthy’’; lifetime3. Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for socio-demographic
information2 and their zero-order correlations with scores on the
LOT-R.2 For the regression analysis, socio-demographic information was coded into
binary variables: male vs. female; married/cohabiting vs. unmarried; living alone
vs. living with others; university level education vs. lower than university level
education; Dutch nationality vs. other nationality; current smoker vs. current non-
smoker; no or hardly any alcohol consumption vs. at least a glass of alcohol per3.1. Optimism and vividness of positive future imagery
Hierarchical regression was used to test our key hypothesis
that ability to generate vivid images of positive future scenarios
would predict optimism when controlling for other variables. In
step 1, socio-demographic variables were entered. In step 2, score
on the SUIS and vividness for negative items on the PIT were
entered, to control for the everyday use of imagery and general
ability to generate vivid mental images. In step 3, vividness
ratings for the positive items of the PIT were entered. Table 1
summarises the regression. Adding the SUIS and vividness for
negative items on the PIT in step 2 did not signiﬁcantly improve
the ﬁt of the model (DR2¼0.003, DF(2, 224)o1). However, adding
the vividness ratings for the positive items of the PIT in step
3 signiﬁcantly improved the ﬁt of the model (DR2¼0.19, DF(1,
223)¼63.81, Po0.001). In the ﬁnal model, higher ratings for
vividness of positive items on the PIT were signiﬁcantly asso-
ciated with higher scores on the LOT-R, and higher ratings for
vividness of negative items on the PIT were signiﬁcantly asso-
ciated with lower scores on the LOT-R. The only other variable
with a signiﬁcant regression coefﬁcient was age. Examination of
residuals plots revealed no multivariate outliers, and no problems
with collinearity were identiﬁed (inspection of Tolerance/Var-
iance Inﬂation Factors; Clark-Carter, 2010). In summary, the
regression supported our key hypothesis by demonstrating thatdiagnosis from a doctor of serious illness (cardiovascular disease, stroke, diabetes,
cancer, asthma, emphysema, chronic bronchitis) vs. never received such diag-
noses. We included variables such as marital status and self-rated health that have
previously shown associations with optimism (Giltay et al., 2007) in order to
examine whether a strong relationship between our cognitive variable of interest
(vividness of positive future imagery) and optimism remained even when
controlling for these other associations.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics, and Pearson product-moment correlations between scores on measures of optimism, everyday use of imagery, and subscales of the Prospective
Imagery Test.
M (S.D.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. LOT-R 17.08 (4.35)
2. SUIS 35.15 (8.56) 0.03
PIT-Positive
3. Vividness 3.88 (0.68) 0.44nnn 0.22nn
4. Likelihood 4.72 (0.99) 0.45nnn 0.12 0.75nnn
5. Experiencing 4.54 (1.18) 0.30nnn 0.21nn 0.69nnn 0.78nnn
PIT-Negative
6. Vividness 2.81 (0.97) 0.08 0.18nn 0.34nnn 0.05 0.10
7. Likelihood 2.86 (0.97) 0.24nnn 0.11 0.001 0.007 0.04 0.62nnn
8. Experiencing 2.84 (1.25) 0.15n 0.15n 0.17n 0.09 0.33n 0.70nnn 0.72nnn
N¼237.
LOT-R¼Life Orientation Test-Revised. SUIS¼Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale. PIT-Negative/Positive¼Prospective Imagery Test Negative/Positive items.
n Po0.05.
nn Po0.01.
nnn Po0.001.
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(PIT) was associated with higher levels of dispositional optimism
(LOT-R) even when controlling sociodemographic factors, every-
day use of imagery and vividness of negative future imagery.
3.2. Optimism and other qualities of future imagery
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the measures of
imagery (SUIS and subscales of the PIT), their inter-correlations,
and their zero-order correlations with the LOT-R. Vividness,
likelihood and experiencing ratings for positive items of the PIT
each correlated signiﬁcantly with score on the LOT-R, suggesting
that each of these qualities of the positive future imagery
generated was signiﬁcantly associated with higher levels of
optimism. Conversely, only likelihood and experiencing ratings
for negative items of the PIT correlated signiﬁcantly with score on
the LOT-R, while vividness ratings for negative items on the PIT
and score on the SUIS did not correlate signiﬁcantly with score on
the LOT-R.4. Discussion
This study is the ﬁrst, to our knowledge, to test the prediction
that the ability to generate vivid positive mental imagery of the
future is associated with dispositional optimism. Data from a
community sample supported this association. The relationship
was signiﬁcant when controlling for socio-demographic factors,
general use of imagery, and vividness of negative future imagery.
This suggests that further research is warranted in investigating
positive future imagery as a potential cognitive marker for
optimism and a target for treatment innovation or even preven-
tion in, for example, depression and cardiovascular disease (Giltay
et al., 2004, 2006b).
In addition to imagery vividness, we also considered the
characteristics of likelihood and pre-experiencing. The positive
future images of more optimistic participants were not only more
vivid, but also associated with a sense of greater likelihood of
occurring in the near future, and of ‘‘pre-experiencing’’ the
imagined event (i.e. the sense of it happening now in the present).
This extends the ﬁndings of Sharot et al. (2007), who found in
their functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study that
more optimistic participants rated imagined positive events as
more likely to happen closer in the future than negative events,
and experienced these positive events with a greater sense of pre-
experiencing. We were able to investigate such relationshipswithin a larger representative sample, and controlling for indivi-
dual differences in general imagery use.
Additionally, without the constraint of a subtraction condition,
as in an fMRI study, we could examine the separate relationships
between optimism and the characteristics of positive and nega-
tive future imagery on the PIT. We found a robust relationship
between vividness of positive imagery and optimism, indicating
that the more vividly someone could imagine a future achieve-
ment, for example, the more optimistic the individual was. A
signiﬁcant association between vividness of negative imagery and
optimism only emerged once the relationship between positive
imagery vividness and optimism was controlled for in the
regression. For likelihood and experiencing ratings, both positive
and negative imagery were related to optimism. That is, optimists
showed a greater tendency to endorse, for example, the likelihood
of imagined future positive relationships, yet rated imagined
future disputes with friends as less likely. Optimists were also
more likely to have a greater sense of ‘‘pre-experiencing’’ when
imagining a possible positive future event, but a weaker sense of
pre-experiencing if the imagined future event was negative.
The link between positive future imagery and optimismmay be
understood within a cognitive science framework and with
reference to the hypothesised role of mental simulation in
thinking about and planning the future (Schacter et al., 2008), in
conjunction with the role of emotional valence. That is, when
someone thinks about events in the future, it is likely to be in the
form of mental imagery. As mental imagery has a particularly
strong link to emotion (Holmes and Mathews, 2005), cognitions
about the future that take an imagery form may have a particu-
larly strong impact on the affective tone of the perceived future.
The relative accessibility and clarity of positive vs. negative
mental images will impact differentially on the expectations an
individual has for the future (Sharot et al., 2007). Positive future
images may therefore lead to increased optimism.
However, a greater tendency to use imagery generally in every-
day life (irrespective of emotional valence) would not be expected to
be associated with higher levels of optimism as this would apply
equally to both positive and negative future thinking. This accords
with the lack of relationship between the SUIS and LOT-R in our
study, and also with the ﬁndings of Meevissen et al. (2011), that
merely practising imagery alone (their daily activities condition) did
not lead to increases in optimism. Relatedly, it has been argued that
therapeutic approaches need to focus on boosting positive aspects of
experience and not simply reducing negative aspects (cf. MacLeod
and Moore, 2000; MacLeod, 2012). Consistent with this, our results
suggest that although negative future imagery may be a valid target
S.E. Blackwell et al. / Psychiatry Research 206 (2013) 56–6160for interventions to reduce negative affect, enhancing the ability to
vividly imagine positive future events is likely to be more fruitful in
increasing positive features such as optimism. That is, if someone is
currently unable to imagine a positive future, then simply reducing
the vividness of their negative mental images of the future is likely
to be of limited impact, and rather it is their positive future imagery
that needs boosting.
Limitations of the study include its correlational nature, which
means that issues of causation cannot be explored. Further, fewer
than half of those invited to take part in the study elected to take
part, and so there could be a self-selecting bias in the study
sample; for example, individuals with less awareness of mental
imagery may have declined to participate. Additionally, the
characteristics of those who declined to form part of the ROM
reference sample from which this study sample was drawn have
not been analysed, and so although it was designed to be
representative, the design’s success cannot be assumed. It will
therefore be useful to replicate the main ﬁndings of this study in
other community samples. Future studies investigating the rela-
tionship between future imagery and optimism could also beneﬁt
from including a measure of depression, in order to investigate
whether the relationship found in the current study is indepen-
dent of current mood. Although we measured the ability of
participants to generate vivid future imagery, we did not measure
how much they spontaneously generated or experienced such
imagery in their daily life. We might expect optimists to not only
be better at generating vivid images of positive future events, but
to also experience more of such positive future imagery on a
moment to moment basis. This would be useful to investigate in
future studies, and would also suggest that interventions to boost
optimism should aim to increase not only the ability to generate
vivid positive future images, but also the likelihood of automati-
cally generating such images in the context of ambiguous cues in
their daily lives (cf. Pictet et al., 2011).
This study represents a critical ﬁrst step in identifying a modiﬁ-
able cognitive marker underlying optimism. This cognitive approach
complements research exploring neural (Sharot et al., 2007, 2011) or
genetic (Fox et al., 2009; Fox, 2012) associates of optimistic thinking
styles. The focus on positive imagery ﬁts within a broader literature
exploring its potential relevance across a range of areas, such as
understanding memory in depression (Werner-Seidler and Moulds,
2011) or its use in emotion regulation (Jacob et al., 2011). It is
important to remember that reduced optimism may be a reﬂection
of societal disadvantage, and in this context a cognitive intervention
should not be seen as an alternative to tackling broader societal
problems. However, there are a range of conditions in which a novel
intervention for optimism may be extremely valuable. Current
ﬁndings suggest that innovative imagery-based interventions to
increase optimism should focus on boosting the ability to vividly
imagine positive events in the future, e.g. via a computerized,
potentially even internet-delivered, intervention (Blackwell and
Holmes, 2010).
In summary, why is it that some people see the future as
bright and full of potential? Current results suggest that when
optimists imagine the future, they can literally see, in their mind’s
eye, vivid scenes of positive possibilities. We hope that this
research suggests future avenues for research to develop novel
interventions that will enable more people to take such an
optimistic outlook, and thus improve mental health and physical
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